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Abstract 
A common assumption in the academic literature is that franchise value plays a key role in 
limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced 
competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. We test this 
hypothesis using data for the Spanish banking system. We find that standard measures of 
market concentration do not affect bank risk-taking. However, we find a negative relationship 
between market power measured using Lerner indexes based on bank-specific interest rates 
and bank risk. Our results support the franchise value paradigm. 
Keywords: bank competition, franchise value, Lerner index, credit risk, financial stability. 
JEL classification: G21, L11. 
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1 Introduction 
A common assumption in the academic literature is that excessive competition among 
banks could threaten the solvency of particular institutions and hamper the stability of the 
entire banking system at an aggregate level. Competition arising from the liberalization of 
the banking system should erode the value of a bank’s charter by reducing monopoly rents 
and encourage it to pursue riskier policies in an attempt to maintain its former profits, as per 
Keeley (1990). Examples of riskier policies are taking on more credit risk in the loan portfolio, 
lowering capital levels, or both. These riskier policies should also increase the probability of 
banks experiencing higher non-performing loan ratios and correspondingly more bank 
bankruptcies. In contrast, restrained competition should encourage banks to protect their 
higher franchise values by pursuing safer strategies that contribute to the stability of the whole 
banking system. This franchise value paradigm has been widely supported both theoretically 
and empirically in the banking literature. 
More recently, Boyd and De Nicoló [BDN (2005)] proposed an interesting and 
challenging new viewpoint. Within their model, less competition among banks could result 
in higher interest rates being charged on business loans, which might result in raising the 
credit risk of borrowers as a result of moral hazard issues [as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. 
The increase in firm default risk could lead to higher non-performing loan ratios and greater 
bank instability. The authors argue that this “loan market channel” could eliminate the 
trade-off between competition and financial stability implied by the “deposit channel” derived 
from the franchise value paradigm. Their proposed risk-shifting paradigm argues that 
increased competition across both the loan and deposit markets could decrease borrower 
credit risk and enhance financial stability. In fact, Boyd, De Nicoló and Al Jalal (2006) as well 
as De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2007) provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship 
between banking market concentration and bank risk-taking. 
In this paper, we examine empirically the relationship between bank competition 
and risk-taking. Specifically, we examine whether the relationship is positive, as suggested 
by the franchise value paradigm, or negative, as in the BDN model. We also examine 
whether the relationship is nonlinear, as suggested very recently by Martínez-Miera and 
Repullo (2008). We conduct our analysis within the Spanish national banking system, which 
allows us to use the detailed banking databases maintained by the Banco de España, 
the primary bank regulatory agency in Spain. These data allow us to construct the most 
appropriate empirical measures used to date in examining this key policy relationship. 
We take advantage of the Banco de España’s interest rate database that contains 
monthly information about the marginal interest rates charged by each bank for several 
banking products, such as commercial loans and deposits. We use this information to 
construct Lerner indexes for different banking products as our explanatory variables 
and direct measures of market power and competition. In addition to these measures of 
market power, we also examine standard proxies of market concentration, such as 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann indexes and the number of banks operating in a market 
as explanatory variables, although these results are not statistically significant in general. 
We also use the Banco de España’s credit register database to extract banks’ risk premiums 
from the former marginal interest rates and to obtain banks’ commercial non-performing loan 
ratios (NPL), which are our main empirical measure of bank risk. 
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Our empirical results suggest a negative relationship between market power and 
risk-taking. As bank market power increases (or as competition decreases), bank risk-taking 
declines. These results do not support the risk-shifting paradigm in the BDN model. 
Furthermore, we find little evidence of a U-shaped relationship between competition and risk. 
In summary, our empirical results for the Spanish banking system provide evidence in support 
of the franchise value paradigm. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the topic. In Section 3, we present our databases, 
variables and methodology used to empirically examine the trade-off between competition 
and bank risk. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the baseline results and several robustness 
exercises, and Section 6 concludes. 
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2   Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical literature 
The franchise value paradigm for bank risk-taking, both with and without government 
regulation, is well established in the banking literature. Simply stated, the idea is that banks 
limit their risk-taking in order to protect the quasi-monopoly rents granted by their government 
charters. Increased competition would erode these rents and the value of the charters, which 
would likely lead to greater bank risk-taking and greater financial instability. 
Marcus (1984) used a one-period model to show that franchise value declines as a 
bank engages in riskier policies. Dermine (1986) extended the Klein-Monti model to 
incorporate bankruptcy risk and deposit insurance and found a negative relationship 
between the level of bank credit risk and its deposit market power. Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1986) showed that increased competition erodes the surplus that banks can earn 
by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduction in value leads banks to reduce 
their screening of potential borrowers and, thus, overall portfolio credit quality declines. 
Keeley (1990), following Furlong and Keeley (1989), used a state preference model with two 
periods to show that a decline in franchise value enhances bank risk-taking. Broecker (1990) 
showed that increased competition, measured as an increased number of banks, had a 
negative effect on the average credit-worthiness of the banking system. Besanko and 
Thakor (1993) showed that increased competition erodes informational rents originated from 
relationship banking and enhances risk-taking by banks. In a context of asymmetric 
information, Marquez (2002) showed that an increase in the number of banks in a market 
disperses the borrower-specific information and will result in higher funding costs for 
low-quality borrowers but also in a higher access to credit for low-quality borrowers. 
Using a dynamic optimization model with an infinite horizon, Suárez (1994) showed a 
trade-off between market power and solvency. If the market power of the bank decreases, 
the incentive to engage in riskier policies increases significantly. As the franchise value of the 
bank is a component of bankruptcy costs, it should encourage the bank to carry out prudent 
policies that increase the solvency of the bank.1 Matutes and Vives (1996 and 2000) showed 
in a framework of imperfect competition (i.e., product differentiation) that higher market power 
reduces a bank’s default probability. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) in a dynamic 
model of moral hazard showed that competition can have a negative impact on prudent bank 
behavior. Capital requirements are not enough to reduce the gambling incentives and they 
need to add deposit rate controls as a regulatory instrument. Building on the former paper, 
Repullo (2004) used a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking to show that in the 
absence of regulation, more competition (i.e., lower bank margins) leads to more risk. 
Risk-based capital requirements were found to effectively control the risk-shifting incentives. 
Allen and Gale (2000 and 2004) showed that different models can provide different results 
regarding the trade-off between banking competition and stability.2
As an important challenge to the franchise value paradigm, Boyd and De Nicoló 
[BDN (2005)] developed a model, modifying one presented by Allen and Gale (2000), 
where an increase in bank market power both in the loan and deposit markets translates 
 
                                                                            
1. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) also consider the franchise value a component of the private cost of 
bankruptcy. 
2. Carletti and Hartmann (2003) and Carletti (2006) survey the literature on financial competition and stability. 
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into higher loan rates charged to borrowers. In a moral hazard environment [as in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981)], entrepreneurs facing higher interest rates on their loans would choose to 
increase the risk of their investment projects, a practice that would lead to more problem 
loans and a higher bankruptcy risk for banks. They find a monotonic declining relationship 
between competition (measured as the number of banks lending in a market) and bank risk; 
that is, as the number of banks and competition increases, the level of bank risk would 
decline. 
In a recent paper, Martínez-Miera and Repullo [MMR (2008)] propose a way to 
reconcile the franchise value paradigm and the insights of the BDN model. They show that 
the former monotonic relationship might become U-shaped if imperfect default correlation 
across firms were permitted. Under this assumption, the risk-shifting effect (i.e., higher risk of 
firm failure as loan interest rates increase) has to be balanced against the effect of the higher 
margins obtained from firms that are able to repay even at the higher interest rates. 
Depending on the degree of default correlation across firms and the intensity of the 
risk-shifting effect, it is possible to find an initial decline in risk as the number of banks 
increases (i.e., as bank competition increases), but an eventual increase in risk as the number 
of banks operating in a market keeps growing.3
2.2 Empirical literature 
 
The empirical literature that we address in this paper focuses on the relationship between 
competition in banking markets and bank risk. The extant studies use different measures 
of bank competition (particularly deposit market competition) and bank risk exposures. 
Keeley (1990) measured the degree of bank competition using Tobin’s q, which is defined 
as the ratio of a bank’s equity market valuation to its book value, as a proxy for banks’ market 
power. First, he showed that liberalization measures eroded Tobin’s q, controlling for 
macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics. Second, he showed that measures 
of bank risk were correlated with market power. Bank solvency ratios, defined as the market 
value of capital divided by the market value of assets, had a positive relationship, such that 
higher market power was correlated with greater solvency. In addition, bank funding costs via 
large certificates of deposit had a negative relationship; that is, as market power increased, 
the perceived bankruptcy risk of large banks decreased and so did the cost of their uninsured 
deposits. On aggregate, these results support the franchise value paradigm. 
Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) showed that U.S. banks with greater 
market power also have the largest solvency ratios and a lower level of asset risk. Saunders 
and Wilson (1996), for a sample of U.S. banks and a period of a century, found support for 
Keeley’s results in the period from 1973 to 1992.4
                                                                            
3. Caminal and Matutes (2002) had already shown that the relationship between market power and bank failures is 
ambiguous. 
  For a sample of publicly traded U.S. thrifts, 
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) found a negative relationship between franchise value and risk 
measured as the volatility of their stock prices. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) 
expressed the view that Japanese financial-market liberalization in the 1990s increased 
competition and reduced the profitability and franchise value of domestic banks, which, jointly 
with other factors, lead to the East Asian financial crisis and a weaker financial system in 
Japan. Salas and Saurina (2003) replicated Keeley’s work for Spain, finding a very significant 
and robust relationship between Tobin’s q and the solvency and non-performing loan ratios 
4. In fact, Rhoades and Rutz (1982) had already found, using a quite different methodology, that banks with higher 
market power (measured using a concentration index) were more risk-averse. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1005 
of Spanish banks.5
In contrast, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) showed that bank performance, 
measured using return on assets, return on equity, and several indicators of credit 
quality, improved significantly after restrictions on banks’ geographic expansion were lifted 
in the U.S. Moreover, loan losses decreased sharply after statewide branching was 
permitted. Thus, an increase in competition seems to have had the opposite effect of 
the franchise value paradigm. Nevertheless, Dick (2006) provides evidence of a positive 
and significant relationship between banking deregulation and increases in loan losses. 
Hannan and Prager (1998) showed that liberalization of interstate branching and operations 
increased competition in the deposit market and reduced profitability, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, Dick and Lehnert (2007) find that interstate banking deregulation led to an increase 
in the rate of consumer bankruptcy. Moreover, the literature focusing on new bank entrants 
finds that increases in loan market competition may increase loan losses due to the winner’s 
curse arising from larger degrees of asymmetric information; see Shaffer (1998). 
 Greater market power was found to be correlated with higher bank 
solvency ratios and lower credit risk losses. For Italy, Bofondi and Gobbi (2004) found that a 
bank’s loan default rate increases as the number of banks in a market increases. 
In the above-mentioned studies, differences in the degree of bank competition were 
either cross-sectional or caused by key changes in regulation within one country. Several 
other studies have examined this relationship in a cross-country setting. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2006) examine banking data for 69 countries over a 20 year period, and 
they found that more concentrated national banking systems are subject to a lower 
probability of systemic banking crisis and hence are more stable. However, they cast doubts 
on the appropriateness of the share of assets of the three largest banks in the banking 
system of each country (i.e., their C3 measure) and related measures as proxies for 
competitiveness in a national banking system. Claessens and Laeven (2004) showed 
a positive and significant relationship between bank concentration, proxied using the C5 
measure and the H-statistic, and a measure of the intensity of competition in a market 
according to Panzar and Rosse (1987). Robustness analyses of this result showed that 
the relationship between concentration and the H-statistic could also be insignificant, 
and they concluded that bank concentration is not a good summary of the bank competitive 
environment.6
Overall, there seems to be a significant amount of literature supporting the 
franchise value paradigm. In contrast, Boyd, De Nicoló and Al Jalal (2006) provided 
cross-country empirical evidence supporting the risk-shifting model using several 
measures of bank risk — namely a z-score based on bank returns on assets (ROA), 
its dispersion measured as σ(ROA), and the ratio of equity to total assets — and bank 
competition measured using a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI). They examined two 
data samples: a cross section of around 2,500 small, rural banks operating in only 
one market area within the U.S. and a panel of about 2,700 banks from 134 countries, 
excluding Western countries. In both samples, they found a negative and significant 
 Also using the H-statistic as the measure of competitiveness, Levy-Yeyati 
and Micco (2007) found an increase in bank risk as bank competition increased in eight 
Latin American countries. 
                                                                            
5. The paper contains a detailed overview of regulatory changes in Spain during the last three decades as well as some 
description of the institutional setting. In particular, Spain has a pre-funded deposit insurance system based on flat rates 
on deposits, which is independent of bank risk level. The analysis presented here differs markedly both in terms of the 
variables and methodology used. 
6. A survey of the literature on bank concentration and competition is in Berger et al (2004). 
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relationship between their z-score and the HHI; thus, more concentrated banking markets are 
associated with greater risk of bank failures. Moreover, De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2007) 
found that this result is stronger when bank ownership is taken into account. Also in a 
cross-country setting, Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe (2006) found that more competitive national 
banking systems are less prone to systemic crises based on their analysis of 38 countries 
over the period from 1980 to 2003 again using the H statistic. 
In a recent paper, Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008) find an interesting set of 
results based upon both loan risk and overall bank risk. Using cross-sectional data 
on 29 developed countries for the years 1999 through 2005, they find that banks with a 
higher degree of market power exhibit significantly more loan portfolio risk, but they also have 
lower overall risk exposure mainly due to their higher equity capital levels. Their results 
for 60 developing countries are mixed, which they suggest is due to the smaller number of 
observations available. 
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3 Data and model description 
3.1 Data 
In this paper, we use precise measures of bank market power and risk-taking to test whether 
the franchise value paradigm, the risk-shifting paradigm, or both apply to the Spanish 
banking system. Our dependent variable measure of risk-taking is a bank’s commercial 
non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, which is an ex-post measure of credit risk.7 It includes 
doubtful loans plus loans more than 90 days overdue. We focus on commercial credit risk 
for two reasons. First, the BDN and MMR models are based importantly on the borrowing 
behavior of commercial firms, and second, credit risk is the primary driver of risk for most 
banks, although other risks exist. The NPL ratios for Spanish banks are obtained from 
the credit register maintained by the Banco de España, which is known as the Central de 
Información de Riesgos (CIR). The CIR contains information on any loan, including mortgages 
and consumer loans, above a minimum threshold of €6,000 granted by any bank operating 
in Spain. Therefore, it contains a full census of commercial loans granted in Spain. We have 
monthly information starting in 1984, but for practical reasons, we use only annual data from 
the month of December without loss of generality.8
As discussed previously, various measures of the degree of bank competition 
have been used in the banking literature. While many papers have used concentration 
measures as proxies for bank competition, we share the concern expressed by Claessens 
and Laeven (2004) regarding the meaning of these concentration variables. For our paper, 
we take advantage of another database maintained by the Banco de España that records the 
marginal interest rate each bank charges on an array of banking products — credit lines, 
credit granted against invoices or other payment documents (i.e., receivables), mortgages, 
deposits, etc. — each month over the period from 1988 through 2003. That is, for each 
bank and each banking product, we have the average interest rate set on that product for 
new transactions.
 
9
The Lerner index is a commonly used measure of market power that captures 
the degree to which a firm can increase their marginal price beyond their marginal cost. 
It is considered to be a more accurate measure of market power than more commonly used 
concentration measures.
 Using this interest rate information, we can produce a Lerner index 
for commercial loan products for each bank in our sample. 
10 The computation of the Lerner index requires a proper estimation 
of the marginal cost of the product, which for bank loans requires a measure of the risk 
premium charged. Failure to take the risk premium into account would result in significant 
biases in measuring bank market power.11
                                                                            
7. In the robustness section, we also use dispersion measures of credit risk, with no change in the results. 
 If the interest rate on a loan is denoted as R1, the 
Lerner index (or gross profit margin relative to the market price) is defined as (R1 – R)/R1, 
where R is the marginal cost to the bank of acquiring the funds for the loan. If we introduce 
the realistic assumption that the marginal operating costs of loans and deposits are either 
fixed in the very short term or impossible to calculate separately, we assume that banks have 
8. A more detailed description of the CIR database can be found in Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas and 
Saurina (2006). 
9. A more detailed description of this database can be found in Martín, Salas and Saurina (2007). 
10. Under conventional assumptions, Tirole (1988) shows that the Lerner index can be related to measures of welfare 
losses such as Harberger’s (1964) triangle. In a recent paper, Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández and Udell (2008) 
also use the Lerner index to test the impact of market power on SME lending constraints. 
11. We follow Martín, Salas and Saurina (2006) in what follows to properly construct the Lerner indexes. 
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a lower bound on the marginal cost for their loans equal to the interest rate offered in the 
interbank market.12
However, banks must introduce a risk premium into their prices to account 
for credit risk. Let PD be the probability that a loan, with a normalized face value 
of one, will default over a specified horizon, and let LGD be the amount of the loan’s 
value that the bank cannot collect in case of default. If the interbank interest rate r is assumed 
to be risk-free, the marginal opportunity cost of the loan for a risk-neutral bank will be 
the interest rate R that satisfies the condition that the risk-free value of the loan equals the 
expected value of the loan, given the PD and LGD parameters. From this simple identity, the 
marginal cost R = (r+PD∙LGD)/(1-PD∙LGD) can be derived. For our calculations, the risk-free 
interest rate r is the annual average of the daily interbank rate. The bank-specific, 
not borrower-specific, PD is obtained directly from the CIR; for a given bank and loan 
product at the end of year t, PD equals the bank’s ratio of defaulted loans divided by total 
outstanding loans of that type. Since we do not have bank-specific information regarding 
LGD, we use the value 45% set by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors in its new 
capital framework.
 
13
For our analysis, we calculate Lerner indexes for commercial banking receivables 
and credit lines as well as all loans, including mortgages and consumer loans. We also 
compute Lerner indexes for deposits by assuming separability between loan and deposit 
pricing and that the interbank rate acts as upper bound for deposit rates. The Lerner index 
for deposits is calculated as (r-Rd)/r, where Rd is the bank’s offered rate on deposits. We also 
calculate an average Lerner index for loans and deposits together in order to consider 
the possibility that loan and deposit markets cannot be separated. In addition to these 
more accurate measures of market power, we also examine standard concentration 
variables — C5, HHI and the number of banks operating in each market — as proxies for 
market power. Note that the last variable is the one used explicitly in the BDN and 
MMR models. 
 
Given that our dependent variable is the level of credit risk at each bank and that the 
Spanish credit market is segmented geographically into 50 provinces, the concentration 
measures reflect the degree of concentration each bank faces in each of the regional markets 
where it operates. We construct an aggregate measure for each bank using a weighted 
average, where the weights are the market share of commercial loans each bank holds in 
each province. If a bank only operates in a province, it faces the concentration indicators of 
that province; whereas if a bank operates nationwide, it has a nationwide weighted index 
for each of the concentration measures.14 Again, the concentration variables refer to the 
commercial loan market to be consistent with our other risk and competition measures and to 
test the risk-shifting paradigm. Finally, in our analysis, we also use a database on banks’ 
accounting data to control for individual bank characteristics, such as return on assets (ROA). 
We focus on commercial and savings banks, 95% of the credit market to firms.15
                                                                            
12. Freixas and Rochet (1997) review bank pricing models in different competitive regimes and information conditions. 
 
13. We conduct these calculations in order to obtain a measure of bank market power that accounts for the risk 
premiums included in bank loan. Concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of our Lerner variables might arise, 
but we address them directly in the analysis. First, our GMM estimation methods appropriately instrument for this 
variable. Second, the simple correlation between banks’ product-specific PDs and commercial NPL ratios is rather 
low in our sample, and third, our analysis is robust across banking products. 
14. In the robustness section, we show that this aggregation procedure has no impact on the results of the paper. 
15. Credit cooperatives and specialized lenders are excluded because of the lack of the required data on interest rates. 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used. We have 1,262 
bank-year observations for more than one hundred commercial and savings banks over 
the 14-year sample.16
Next, we summarize our various concentration measures as proxies for the degree 
of bank competition. While there are a reasonably large number of banks operating in each 
provincial credit market, there is a high degree of dispersion, ranging from provinces with 
22 banks to 148 banks in certain years. We do not have more detailed geographical market 
breakdowns but, in general, it is easy to see a significant correlation between the population 
of the province and the number of banks operating there. Madrid and Barcelona, by far the 
most populated provinces, have a much higher number of banks. The correlation coefficient 
for the logged province population and the log of the number of banks in the province is 
stable at 0.88 in 1990 and 0.85 in 2000. Across provinces, we observe a variety of patterns 
regarding the number of banks. 
 The average NPL ratio is 4.4% with a large degree of dispersion 
across banks; ranging from 0% to above 38%. As shown in Figure 1, there is significant 
variation over time in this variable with the median NPL ratio at around 2% at the beginning 
of the sample period, rising to a median value of 7% in 1993, and falling to around 1% 
in recent years. These time dynamics are related to the Spanish business cycle, which 
experienced a deep recession around 1993 and two expansion periods before and 
after 1993. Real interest rates declined steadily during the period, as the Spanish economy 
converged to that of the euro zone countries. 
For commercial loans, the market share of the first five commercial lenders in each 
province, denoted as C5, is relatively high with an average of 58%, ranging from 40% to 74%. 
Across provinces and time, there are occasional jumps in the C5 index as large banks merge. 
Regarding mergers, we have treated banks merged as two separate entities before the 
merge and as a new one after it. 
The HHI for commercial loans has an average of around 8, which roughly implies 
12 banks of equal size per market. Since this number is well below the average number 
of 76 banks per province, a large number of banks in each market must have a tiny 
market share with only one or a few branches in the province. This fact further points towards 
the careful use of the number of banks as a proxy for competition in a market, even though it 
is the one that comes out of theoretical models. The loan HHI shows no clear cross-sectional 
pattern across provinces. 
 With respect to our Lerner index measures, the average index for receivables 
is positive, although relatively small; margins on receivables are only about 15% of the 
rates charged once the risk premium has been accounted for. For credit lines, the index 
is negative on average and zero at the median, suggesting that the median interest rate on 
credit lines only covers the funding cost plus the risk premium applied to the borrower. 
The Lerner index for the whole loan portfolio is on average positive, but again quite small; 
banks earn only a 5% margin, on average, on all of their lending. As shown in Figure 2A, 
this Lerner index has an upward trend as of 1995, partly due to a decline in the interbank 
rate as European monetary unification approached. On the other hand, the Lerner index for all 
deposits declined during the first half of the sample period and later on fluctuated at 33% of 
average deposits rates, as shown in Figure 2B. The joint Lerner index for loans and deposits 
                                                                            
16. This is the final number of observations used to run the regressions, after taking first differences and allowing 
for lags in the instruments. The original number of observations was 1,632. The data is uniformly distributed across the 
entire 16 years of the sample period from 1988 to 2003. 
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averages about 40% with a maximum value of 100% but with some negative values; in which 
case, the loan interest rate does not cover the deposit rate and the risk premium. 
Table 1 also shows that commercial and savings banks have an average annual 
ROA of 0.66% for the period analyzed, with a high degree of heterogeneity. In the sample, 
we measure bank size using the share of total CIR loans that the bank originated. 
The average value is 0.7%, which is relatively small, but the range goes up to a maximum 
value of 9.3%; thus, we have also heterogeneity in bank sizes. Finally, there is a significant 
difference in degrees of specialization in the commercial lending (LOAN RATIO) as some 
banks concentrate on commercial lending (as high as 90%), while others almost do not 
operate in that market segment. 
3.2 Model description 
To examine the various hypotheses regarding the franchise value paradigm, the risk-shifting 
hypothesis of the BDN model and the encompassing U-shaped relationship in the MMR 
model, we estimate the general regression: 
 
RISKit = f(COMPETITION INDEXit, BUSINESS CYCLEit, BANK CONTROL VARIABLESit), (1) 
 
where the subscript i refers to a bank and the subscript t refers to a sample year. The model 
sets the relationship between the specified bank risk measure and the specified bank market 
competition measure, controlling for bank characteristics and the state of the business cycle. 
The actual model specification we examine is: 
 
 
2
it
it it 1
1 2it
it it 1
t1 2 t 1
1 2 3it it it i it
NPL NPL
ln ln STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
100 NPL 100 NPL
GDPG GDPG
                         ROA + SIZE LOAN RATIO .
−
−
−
   
      
   
= α+β + δ + δ
− −
+ γ + γ
+ φ φ + φ +η + ε (2) 
 
The dependent bank risk variable is the log-odds transformation of a bank’s 
NPL ratio. We use this transformation to change the variable’s support from the unit 
interval to the real number line. There is a significant degree of persistence in the transformed 
NPL variable, since the average value of the first-order autocorrelation is 0.68. Hence, 
we include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable.17
We control for business cycle conditions by introducing the current and lagged 
values of the annual real GDP growth rate, since problem loans develop in line with 
the business cycle. We also control for the profitability of the bank, its size, and its 
specialization in commercial lending using  its contemporaneous ROA, its market share 
in terms of CIR total loans (SIZEit), and its percentage of total assets that represent 
commercial loans (LOAN RATIOit), respectively. 
 
                                                                            
17. See Salas and Saurina (2002) for a more detailed discussion. 
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Our primary variables of interest are related to the structure of the banking 
market and the degree of bank market competition, denoted STRUCTUREit. For the 
loan market, we use the number of banks, C5, HHI as well as our preferred Lerner indexes 
for receivables, credit lines and all loans. For the deposit market, we use the Lerner index for 
total deposits, and we also examine the sum of the Lerner indexes for the broadest loan 
and deposit categories. We include the squared STRUCTUREit term in our regressions to 
test whether the relationship between the number of banks and bank risk might not be linear. 
We include the bank fixed effect ηi to control for unobservable bank characteristics constant 
over time, and εit is a random error that has a normal distribution. 
In our model specification, positive and significant values for δ1 and δ2 would 
provide evidence in support of the risk-shifting paradigm; that is, as market power 
increases (and competition decreases), bank riskiness as measured by NPL ratios would 
also increase. In contrast, if these parameters are negative and significant, increased market 
power would lead to less bank risk, which is supportive of the franchise value paradigm. If δ1 
is significantly negative and δ2 is significantly positive, the results would support the U-shaped 
pattern proposed in the MMR model.18
Regarding the other explanatory variables, we expect a significant positive coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variable and a significant negative effect for the GDPG variables, 
since problem loans should increase in bad times. We do not have clear expectations for the 
bank characteristics. In general, there should be a positive, long-term relationship between 
risk and return, but banks with high NPL ratios might experience significant losses in a 
particular year. The specialization of a bank should be indicative of improved monitoring 
and screening of borrowers, but, at the same time, specialized banks might be willing to take 
more risks. Finally, there is no general support for a certain relationship between the size of 
the bank and its risk level. A larger bank benefits from risk diversification but, at the same 
time, bank managers could take advantage of that in order to push further along the risk 
profile of the bank.
 
19
It is possible that unobservable bank characteristics are correlated with the 
bank NPL ratios; for example, the risk aversion of bank managers and/or shareholders. 
In this case, an OLS estimation of model (2) would produce biased parameters due to the 
lagged dependent variable. To address these estimation problems, we use the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) procedure and estimate the model in first-difference from using GMM 
estimation techniques. We thus treat bank characteristics as endogenous and use their 
second lag to instrument for them. We also consider the concentration and market 
power measures as potentially endogenous and instrument for them with the second lag. 
The validity of these instruments is tested using the standard Hansen test. Since we take 
first differences, we should observe first-order autocorrelation and no second-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals.
 
20
                                                                            
18. We also estimated the regression model without the quadratic term, and the overall results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 
19. See, for instance, Hughes et al. (1996) for this last result. 
20. Note that we also estimated the model using just two lags as well as all available lags as instruments, but the overall 
qualitative results were unchanged.  
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Correlations 
Table 2 presents the pairwise correlations between the variables. We find a negative 
relationship between all our measures of bank market power and bank’s commercial 
NPL ratios, our measure of bank risk. The correlations for the different loan market Lerner 
indexes range from -0.56 to -0.20, and the correlation for the deposit market Lerner index 
is -0.09. Both the C5 and HHI measures for both markets show a negative, although low 
correlation, with ex-post credit risk. Therefore, simple correlation analysis suggests a negative 
relationship between market power and bank risk, supporting the franchise value paradigm. 
As expected, commercial NPL ratios are correlated negatively with the business 
cycle. Specialization in commercial lending is correlated with lower NPL ratios, probably due 
to enhanced screening and monitoring of borrowers. We find that current problem loans 
have a negative impact on current profitability. The correlation between size of the bank and 
risk in business loans seems weak. Bank profitability seems to be inversely related to the 
number of banks operating in each local market and positively related to the standard 
concentration measures as well as market power indicators. However, the absolute value 
of correlation coefficients is, in general, low and in the range of  [0.16, 0.24] for loans and 
is 0.18 for deposits. The correlation with the number of banks is actually -0.36. 
With the data available for this study, we can examine in greater empirical 
detail the key theoretical concept on bank market concentration proposed by Boyd and 
De Nicoló (2005); namely, the distinction between concentration in the deposit and the loan 
markets. Among concentration measures, there is a strong negative correlation between 
the number of banks operating in a market and the C5 and HHI measures for both loan and 
deposit markets, ranging from -0.67 to -0.42. The C5 and HHI measures for both markets 
are highly correlated (around 0.85) with each other. Across the two markets, the correlations 
based on these concentration measures are also high at +0.82 for the C5 measure 
and +0.59 for the HHI measure. Therefore, C5 and HHI seem to be interchangeable as 
concentration proxies. 
However, a very different picture emerges for the Lerner measures of market 
power. Within markets, the correlations between the Lerner measures and the two 
concentration measures drop sharply to between +0.15 and +0.21. The correlation 
between concentration and market power variables is positive, but generally weak. A proper 
test of the franchise value paradigm needs, therefore, a more direct measure of market 
power than the usual concentration proxies used in the literature. Across the markets, 
the correlations between the Lerner indexes are quite low at +0.12, suggesting that loan and 
deposit markets might behave separately. 
Finally, it should be noticed that, in general, market power is procyclical; that is, 
macroeconomic improvements seem to increase market power in the Spanish market. 
Concentration measures are also positively correlated with the business cycle indicator, 
but with low values. 
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4.2 Regression results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for our baseline model. The table’s six columns 
differ only by the market structure measure used. The validity of the instruments for our 
specification is satisfactory in all cases, as shown by the Hansen test. Moreover, as expected 
since we estimate the model in first differences, there is significant first-order serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals, but no significant second-order autocorrelation. 
In all six regressions, the lagged endogenous variable is significant at the 1% level 
with a parameter value around 0.5, confirming the persistence shown in the NPL ratios. 
The contemporaneous GDP growth rate is negative and significant at the 1% level, while the 
lagged GDP growth rate is always negative but only significant in the last four columns 
based on the Herfindahl and Lerner measures. The parameters for these lagged variables are, 
in absolute terms, always less than half of the contemporaneous ones, indicating that 
business cycle changes quickly influence firms’ problem loans. 
For the bank characteristics, larger banks have lower NPL ratios in all six 
regressions. Thus, it seems that portfolio diversification and possibly better managerial 
ability at larger banks play a role in mitigating credit risk within Spain. We find that the 
more specialized a bank is in commercial lending, the lower its problem loan ratio in 
that sector. This result is statistically significant for the first, second and fourth regressions 
at the 1% level, significant at 5% level for the third one, significant only at the 10% level 
for the sixth, and insignificant for the fifth. These results suggest that specialization 
improves the screening and monitoring abilities of banks. Finally, ROA as a measure of bank 
profitability is insignificant in the six regressions. 
Regarding the structure variables, the first column of Table 3 shows that the number 
of banks operating in a market does not seem to have any effect on bank risk-taking. 
Therefore, the strict risk-shifting propositions are not confirmed by the data.21
More interesting are the last three columns based on the Lerner market power 
measures. The δ1 and δ2 estimates are both negative and significant at the 1% level in all 
cases. An increase in market power for loans, measured as an increase in the Lerner indexes 
for receivables, credit lines and total loans, produces a decline in the risk profiles of the 
banks in our sample. Thus, we find strong empirical evidence supporting the franchise 
value paradigm. Furthermore, since both coefficients are negative, we are also able to reject 
the U-shaped relationship between risk and competition. 
 We have 
claimed that concentration measures are rough proxies for market power, and the results for 
the C5 measure support this claim. Column 2 shows that the C5 concentration measure 
for commercial loans has no significant impact on NPL ratios. On the other hand, the linear 
term of the HHI measure for loans is negative while the quadratic term is positive, being both 
significant at the 5% level. In fact, this U-shaped pattern suggests that an increase 
in concentration brings about a decline in credit risk, which is in line with the franchise value 
paradigm, but only up to a certain point. After this threshold, the higher the concentration, 
the higher the credit risk observed, which is in line with the Boyd and De Nicoló paradigm. 
What if the source of market power does not come from the asset side (i.e., loan 
markets) but from the liability side (i.e., deposit markets)? It might be that banks 
earn monopoly rents in the deposit market and that has a different impact on the loan market. 
                                                                            
21. Proposition 2 in Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) states that, in a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium level 
of risk-shifting is strictly decreasing in the number of banks. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1005 
For instance, more market power in deposits could allow banks to be more aggressive in 
the loan market and be prepared to lend to riskier borrowers with the short term objective of 
increasing market share or total assets. Table 4 presents our empirical analysis of these 
issues using our baseline specification, but with deposit market structure measures. 
The regression results in the first two columns show that the relationship is not linear. For low 
values of these measures, increases in concentration cause an increase in NPL ratios, 
but beyond an inflection point situated at roughly a C5 value of 62.6% and an HHI value 
of 16.9, increases in concentration are correlated negatively with NPL ratios. These calculated 
inflection points are situated at the 15th percentile for the C5 measure and at the 57th 
percentile for the HHI measure. In a sense, these results suggest that the franchise 
value paradigm is not rejected 85% and 43% of the time, respectively, by these deposit 
market concentration measures. 
The third column of Table 4 presents the Lerner index results. Market power in 
deposits is uncorrelated with risk. The last column in Table 4 shows clear evidence in favor of 
the franchise value paradigm as more market power, coming either from the loan or deposit 
markets, leads to less bank risk-taking. That is, even if the hypothesis of separability of loans 
and deposits does not hold, the franchise value paradigm holds. 
Overall, we find evidence supporting the franchise value paradigm in that market 
power in loan markets (and less strongly in deposit markets) leads to less bank risk-taking. 
Concentration in the loan or deposit market has a different impact on problem loans 
depending on its level. 
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5 Robustness analysis 
In this section, we present the results of five robustness tests.22
Table 5 shows the results after including the current and the lagged level of real 
interest rates as an additional control variable. The new variables are positive and significant in 
almost all the cases. The GDP growth rate variable is still negative and significant although 
its absolute value has declined, in particular, for the contemporaneous period. These results 
suggest that real interest rates are important macroeconomic determinants of NPL ratios, 
but they do not displace the standard business cycle indicator. Bank characteristics are now 
less significant, and the results do not change much overall. Regarding the main variables 
of interest, the concentration measures of the number of banks and the C5 index are again 
found not to be significant, while the HHI linear and quadratic parameters are now 
insignificant. The last three columns show negative and very significant parameters for the 
three loan market Lerner indexes. Therefore, we find again a positive relationship between 
market power and the solvency of Spanish banks as measured by NPL ratios. Furthermore, 
the MMR conjecture is now rejected because the coefficients on HHI are insignificant. 
Finally, if our macroeconomic effects are substituted by time dummies, the overall qualitative 
nature of our results does not change. 
 The first examines the 
concern that the overall level of interest rates, a key determinant of funding costs, doesn´t 
follow the business cycle perfectly. To address this concern, we include an annual average 
of the one day interbank interest rate in the regression. 
The second robustness test addresses the concern that other controls for bank 
characteristics are needed to capture the firm-specific variation in the data. If we add a 
solvency ratio (calculated as equity over total assets) to the baseline model, we find that 
it is not statistically significant. The sign and significance levels of the other variables 
do not change. This result suggests that the variables we used are probably sufficient for our 
analysis. We also address the specification of bank size by using an alternative measure 
based on the logged total assets. We find similar results for our concentration and market 
power variables, but the other bank control variables are no longer significant. 
For the third set of robustness tests, we take advantage of the level of detail in the 
interest rate database. We estimated our baseline model separately for the ratio of 
non-performing loans in receivables and in credit lines.23
We also used the data set to examine the impact of the risk premium component of 
the Lerner indexes for commercial loan products. Specifically, we substituted the banks’ 
overall PD measure (including mortgages and consumer loans as well as commercial loans) 
 Similarly, we construct all of the 
competition variables based just on the separate product lines. The results are very similar to 
those for the prior aggregated estimation. The market concentration measures are never 
significant at the 10% level. The parameters on the Lerner index based just on receivables 
are both negative and significant at the 1% level, while only the linear term for the Lerner index 
based on credit lines is negative and very significant. Therefore, even if we focus on the 
two main segments of corporate lending separately, we find strong support for the franchise 
value paradigm. 
                                                                            
22. Results not shown here are available upon request. 
23. We thank Allen Berger for suggesting this robustness exercise. 
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into the product-line Lerner indexes instead of their product-line PDs. This approach 
should further mitigate concerns the potential endogeneity of the Lerner measures.24
 In the fourth set of robustness tests, we examined alternative weighting schemes 
to our weighted averages across all provinces for our competition measures. For example, 
we excluded national banks with a presence in all provinces in order to focus more closely on 
local bank competition. The empirical results remain similar to those presented in Tables 3 
and 4. Similarly, if we remove banks that operate in half (i.e., 25) of the provinces and if 
we focus only on those banks that operate in less than 5 provinces (i.e., truly local banks), 
all the results regarding the relationship between market power and risk measures remain 
intact even though the number of observations declines significantly. 
 
Again, we find similar qualitative results as in Table 3. 
Finally, we analyzed the consistence of our results with a related measure of bank 
risk. The non-performing loan ratio can be viewed as a proxy for bank expected losses, since 
it encompasses loans that have shown signs of worsening. Since expected losses are an 
average measure of bank risk that cannot capture unexpected losses, we used the standard 
deviation of a bank’s quarterly NPL ratios for the last two years as a proxy for the volatility of a 
bank’s credit losses. Table 6 shows the results of the GMM estimation of the baseline model 
for the loan market when the explanatory variable is the log of this NPL standard deviation, 
denoted SDNPLit-1. The results are in line with those previously reported. All the measures of 
concentration are insignificant while both the linear and the quadratic term of the Lerner index 
are negative and significant, supporting the franchise value paradigm. None of the market 
structure covariates for the deposit market are significant, but the Lerner index of loan plus 
deposits is negative and statistically significant. 
Another proxy for the risk of a bank that has been used in the literature is a 
market-value-based indicator such as the z-score or a measure of the volatility of banks’ 
share prices. However, quoted banks are a minority in our sample given that savings 
banks are not public companies and some commercial banks are not quoted either. In any 
case, the bank risk profile is very well measured by credit losses or their volatility, as credit 
risk is the most important risk a bank has to cope with.25
Overall, our baseline results seem reasonably robust to various changes in the 
specification of the variables. Therefore, we have found robust support for the franchise value 
paradigm in contrast to other models that allow for greater bank competition to lead to less 
bank risk and more financial stability. At least for Spanish banks during a period of 14 years, 
there is clear evidence of a negative trade-off between bank competition and stability. 
 
                                                                            
24. For example, the simple correlation between NPL ratios for commercial loans and the PD of mortgage loans is 0.11, 
as compared to 0.37 for the PD of total loans. Moreover, endogeneity concerns between NPL and the Lerner indexes 
are properly addressed through the GMM estimation procedure. 
25. While BDN and MMR argue that bank risk can be measured by an accounting z-score (i.e. based on accounting 
data instead of on market value data), it is dominated by the leverage ratio (equity over total assets) that does not 
contain a direct measure of risk; i.e., neither risk weighted assets nor the market value of the bank. 
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6 Conclusions 
In the academic literature the dominant paradigm is that franchise value plays a key 
role in limiting the riskiness of individual banks and hence of banking systems more 
broadly. That is, bank management and shareholders will typically limit or reduce their risk 
exposure to preserve the bank’s franchise value. The underlying source of franchise value 
is typically assumed to be market power, and reduced competition (or, equivalently, market 
concentration) has been considered to promote banking stability. 
Boyd and De Nicoló [BDN (2005)] challenge the traditional view through what we call 
the risk-shifting paradigm. They argue that market concentration could impact bank stability in 
different ways, depending on the net effect across deposit and loan markets. Specifically, 
the authors suggest that concentration in the loan market could lead to increased lending 
rates that both raise the borrowers’ debt loads and default probabilities as well as their 
incentive to engage in riskier projects via moral hazard. More recently, Martínez-Miera and 
Repullo [MMR (2008)] extend the BDN model to allow for a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and bank risk-taking, such that both the franchise value and risk-shifting 
paradigms could be possible. 
Using unique datasets covering the Spanish banking system, we explicitly examine 
the relationship between bank competition and risk. Our dependent variable is a bank’s ratio 
of non-performing commercial loans (NPL). After controlling for macroeconomic conditions 
and bank characteristics, we examine the impact of various measures of competition in 
both the loan and deposit markets. We find that the number of banks has little effect 
on NPL ratios. Other concentration measures, such as the C5 and HHI indexes for loan and 
deposit markets separately and together, also do not affect bank NPL ratios. 
These measures of market concentration are typically used as a proxy for measures 
of market power. For the Spanish banking system, we are able to construct market power 
measures based on Lerner indexes using bank-specific marginal interest rates on a variety 
of banking products. Our empirical results show that Lerner measures of loan market 
power have a negative relationship with bank risk; that is, as market power increases, 
bank NPL ratios decrease. This result is direct evidence in support of the franchise value 
paradigm. We obtain the similar, although weaker, results for deposits. Finally, joint loan and 
deposit Lerner indexes have a negative and very significant impact on banks’ non-performing 
loan ratios. Our results do not support the existence of the risk-shifting effects permitted 
in the BDN model. Additionally, our results are robust to using the standard deviation of 
the NPL ratios for the last eight quarters, as an alternative bank risk measure that better 
captures unexpected losses. 
The main contribution of our paper is to perform a focused and precise test of 
the relationship between bank competition and bank risk using data for the Spanish 
banking market. Our empirical results provide clear support for the franchise value paradigm. 
As competitive pressures decrease, the risk appetite of banks should diminish, which should 
in turn contribute to reinforcing the overall stability of the banking system. On the other hand, 
given the impact of competition on efficiency, there is a need to reflect on what the 
proper trade-off between competition and financial stability should be. Our paper shows 
that this trade-off exists, something that the recent literature had challenged. We leave for 
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future research a more comprehensive discussion of the impact on overall welfare of a less 
stringent degree of competition across banks in order to enhance financial stability. 
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Figure 1. Time series of the non-performing loan ratio 
 
This figure shows the time evolution of the non-performing loan ratio (%) of 
the sample of banks used in the study by quartiles (i.e., Q25, Median and Q75). The 
time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003 
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Figure 2A. Time series of the Lerner index for the whole loan portfolio 
 
This figure shows the time evolution of the Lerner index for the whole loan 
portfolio of the sample of banks used in the study by quartiles (i.e., Q25, Median and 
Q75). The time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003 
 
Figure 2B. Time series of the Lerner index for all deposits 
 
This figure shows the time evolution of the Lerner index for all deposits of 
the sample of banks used in the study by quartiles (i.e., Q25, Median and Q75). The 
time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for bank-year observations 
 
NPLit is the commercial non-performing loan ratio of  bank i at time t; GDPGt is the 
real GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy at time t; INTEREST RATEt is the one-
day real interbank interest rate at time t; SIZEit is the market share of bank i at time t 
in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of firm i at time t in 
the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans to firms over total loans; ROAit is 
the return on assets of bank i at time t; Number of banksit is the number of banks 
that has the representative province for bank i at time t, calculated as the weighted 
average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the bank grants loans (the other 
concentration and competition measures are obtained in the same way); C5 
denotes the share of the 5 largest banks in the representative province for bank i at 
time t; Herit is the Herfindahl index of concentration for the representative province of 
bank i at time t, calculated in each province as the sum of banks’ squared market 
shares in loans granted in the province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in year t 
defined for product l of the asset side as (Rl -R)/ Rl, where R is the credit risk 
adjusted marginal cost of product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is defined as 
(R- Rl)/ R for deposits. The time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003. We have 
1,632 observations from which, after taking first differences and instrumenting 
remain 1,262 corresponding to 107 unique banks (commercial and savings banks). 
 
Variables Mean S.D Median Minimum Maximum
  NPLit 4.44 4.93 2.66 0.00 38.02
  GDPGt 2.92 1.56 2.76 -1.03 5.04
  INTEREST RATEt 3.57 2.85 3.56 -0.67 8.12
  SIZEit 0.70 1.27 0.28 0.00 9.32
  LOAN RATIOit 25.41 12.55 23.00 0.08 90.14
  ROAit 0.66 1.19 0.72 -16.19 11.08
  Number of banksit 75.93 24.77 73.00 22.00 148.00
  C5_loansit 57.73 6.60 58.44 40.00 74.25
  Her_loans_firmsit 8.22 1.86 8.09 4.14 15.02
  Lerner_receivablesit 0.15 0.39 0.19 -7.96 0.64
  Lerner_credit_linesit -0.10 0.50 0.00 -6.09 0.70
  Lerner_loansit 0.05 0.53 0.11 -12.27 0.52
  C5_depositsit 68.00 5.61 67.35 53.70 84.64
  Her_depositsit 16.77 3.67 16.33 7.58 28.57
  Lerner_depositsit 0.35 0.11 0.36 -0.49 0.68
  Lerner_loans+Lerner_depositsit 0.40 0.56 0.47 -11.82 1.05
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients 
 
NPLit is the commercial non-performing loan ratio of  bank i at time t; GDPGt is the real GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy at time t; INTEREST RATEt is 
the one-day real interbank interest rate at time t; SIZEit is the market share of bank i at time t in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of 
firm i at time t in the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans to firms over total loans; ROAit is the return on assets of bank i at time t; Number of banksit is 
the number of banks that has the representative province for bank i at time t, calculated as the weighted average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the 
bank grants loans (the other concentration and competition measures are obtained in the same way); C5 denotes the share of the 5 largest banks in the 
representative province for bank i at time t; Herit is the Herfindahl index of concentration for t he representative province of bank i at  time t, calculated in each 
province as the sum of banks’ squared market shares in loans granted in the province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in year t defined for product l of the 
asset side as (R l -R)/ Rl, where R is the c redit risk adjusted marginal cost of product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is d efined as (R- Rl)/ R  for deposits. 
***; **; *; significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
 
 
 
Variables
  NPLit 1
  GDPGt -0.458 *** 1
  INTEREST RATEt 0.414 *** -0.544 *** 1
  SIZEit -0.095 *** -0.010 -0.017 1
  LOAN RATIOit -0.377 *** 0.135 *** -0.263 *** 0.088 *** 1
  ROAit -0.216 *** 0.090 *** 0.012 -0.025 0.061 ** 1
  Number of banksjt 0.040 -0.069 ** 0.169 *** 0.179 *** -0.062 ** -0.355 *** 1
  C5_loansjt -0.216 *** 0.252 *** -0.508 *** -0.095 *** 0.162 *** 0.227 *** -0.649 *** 1
  Her_loans_firmsjt -0.106 *** 0.165 *** -0.392 *** -0.132 *** 0.115 *** 0.206 *** -0.630 *** 0.853 *** 1
  Lerner_receivablesjt -0.189 *** 0.033 -0.106 *** 0.018 0.180 *** 0.158 *** -0.167 *** 0.013 0.046 1
  Lerner_credit_linesjt -0.557 *** 0.269 *** -0.329 *** -0.033 0.125 *** 0.240 *** -0.251 *** 0.237 *** 0.189 *** 0.142 *** 1
  Lerner_loansjt -0.465 *** 0.303 *** -0.429 *** -0.019 0.135 *** 0.240 *** -0.299 *** 0.213 *** 0.186 *** 0.551 *** 0.719 *** 1
  C5_depositsjt -0.177 *** 0.155 *** -0.448 *** -0.167 *** 0.111 *** 0.196 *** -0.676 *** 0.820 *** 0.773 *** 0.101 *** 0.276 *** 0.288 *** 1
  Her_depositsjt -0.109 *** 0.082 *** -0.280 *** -0.155 *** 0.076 *** 0.128 *** -0.428 *** 0.537 *** 0.591 *** 0.083 *** 0.199 *** 0.202 *** 0.837 *** 1
  Lerner_depositsjt -0.089 *** 0.086 *** 0.047 * -0.090 *** -0.181 *** 0.180 *** -0.185 *** 0.171 *** 0.145 *** -0.005 0.183 *** 0.123 *** 0.160 *** 0.155 *** 1
  Lerner_loans+Lerner_depositsjt -0.446 *** 0.301 *** -0.366 *** -0.049 * 0.056 ** 0.278 *** -0.333 *** 0.251 *** 0.217 *** 0.490 *** 0.706 *** 0.936 *** 0.314 *** 0.235 *** 0.465 *** 1
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Table 3. Baseline estimations. Loan market 
NPLit is the commercial non-performing loan ratio of  bank i at time t; GDPGt is the real GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy at time t; SIZEit is the market 
share of bank i at time t in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of firm i at time t in the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans 
to firms over total loans; ROAit is the return on assets of bank i at time t; Number of banksit is the number of banks that has the representative province for bank i 
at time t, calculated as the weighted average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the bank grants loans (the other concentration and competition measures 
are obtained in the same way); C5 denotes the share of the 5 largest banks in the representative province for bank i at time t;  Herit is the Herfindahl index of 
concentration for the representative province of bank i at time t, calculated in each province as the sum of banks’ squared market shares in loans granted in the 
province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in y ear t defined for product l of the asset side as (Rl -R)/ Rl, where R is the credit risk adjusted marginal cost of 
product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is defined as (R- Rl)/ R for deposits. The time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003. We have 1,632 
 
observations from which, a fter taking first differences and i nstrumenting remain 1,262 corresponding to 107 unique banks. Standard errors (SE) of estimated 
coefficients consistent to any pattern of heteroskedasticity within banks . ***, **, *, mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
STRUCTUREit
Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  Ln(NPLit-1/(100-NPLit-1)) 0.527 7.57 *** 0.516 7.33 *** 0.557 8.05 *** 0.537 9.32 *** 0.484 7.19 *** 0.546 9.45 ***
  GDPGt -0.143 -11.21 *** -0.154 -11.67 *** -0.144 -11.74 *** -0.140 -12.54 *** -0.122 -10.89 *** -0.129 -10.74 ***
  GDPGt-1 -0.030 -1.98 -0.017 -1.12 -0.026 -1.85 * -0.046 -3.53 *** -0.027 -2.20 ** -0.045 -3.85 ***
  STRUCTUREit -5.842 -0.76 -0.015 -0.2 -0.395 -2.3 ** -0.636 -3.23 *** -1.333 -5.07 *** -0.936 -5.24 ***
  STRUCTUREit
2 1.627 0.87 0.000 0.13 0.023 2.37 ** -0.065 -3.21 *** -0.291 -2.46 ** -0.076 -5.24 ***
  SIZEit -0.688 -2.49 ** -0.650 -3.07 *** -0.625 -3.14 *** -0.519 -3.09 *** -0.497 -3.17 *** -0.453 -3.27 ***
  LOAN RATIOit -0.032 -4.35 *** -0.039 -4.09 *** -0.027 -2.55 ** -0.026 -3.09 *** -0.013 -1.63 -0.017 -1.95 *
  ROAit 0.008 0.19 0.000 0.00 -0.006 -0.16 -0.108 -0.86 -0.013 -0.22 0.075 1.27
No. Observations 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,155 1,155 1,155
F  test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test 1rst order serial correlatoin (m1) /p-value -3.86 0.00 -5.12 0.00 -4.15 0.00 -4.63 0.00 -4.34 0.00 -4.34 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlatoin (m2) /p-value -1.54 0.12 -1.63 0.10 -1.49 0.14 -1.39 0.16 -1.22 0.22 -1.36 0.17
Hansen test (p-value) 0.35 0.49 0.19 0.41 0.22 0.29
Bank fixed effects,  ηi yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ln(# banks) C5_loans Her_loans_firms Lerner_receivables Lerner_credit_lines Lerner_loans
21t−iti
i11t−21ti2tiδ1
1t−iti
tiiti3ti2
NPL NPLln ln STRUCTURE + δ STRUCTURE  + γ γ GDPG    + tGDPG + φ ROA100 NPL 100 NPL
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Table 4. Baseline estimations. Deposit market 
NPLit is the commercial non-performing loan ratio of  bank i at time t; GDPGt is the real GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy at time t; SIZEit is the market 
share of bank i at time t in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of firm i at time t in the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans 
to firms over total loans; ROAit is the return on assets of bank i at time t; Number of banksit is the number of banks that has the representative province for bank i 
at time t, calculated as the weighted average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the bank grants loans (the other concentration and competition measures 
are obtained in the same way); C5 denotes the share of the 5 lar gest banks in the r epresentative province for bank i a t time t; Herit is the Herfindahl index of 
concentration for the representative province of bank i at time t, calculated in each province as the sum of banks’ squared market shares in loans granted in the 
province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in y ear t defined for product l of the asset side as (Rl -R)/ Rl, where R is the credit risk adjusted marginal cost of 
product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is defined as (R- Rl)/ R for deposits. The time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003. We have 1,632 
observations from which, a fter taking first differences and i nstrumenting remain 1,262 corresponding to 107 unique banks. Standard errors (SE) of estimated 
coefficients consistent to any pattern of heteroskedasticity within banks . ***, **, *, mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
STRUCTUREit Lerner_loans+Lerner_deposits
Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  Ln(NPLit-1/(100-NPLit-1)) 0.512 6.98 *** 0.501 6.52 *** 0.548 8.64 *** 0.525 8.55 ***
  GDPGt -0.135 -8.78 *** -0.135 -11.18 *** -0.152 -14.04 *** -0.133 -11.16 ***
  GDPGt-1 -0.035 -1.94 * -0.034 -2.04 ** -0.002 -0.13 -0.025 -2.18 **
  STRUCTUREit 0.500 2.27 ** 0.231 3.1 *** 0.100 0.07 -0.995 -5.45 ***
  STRUCTUREit
2 -0.004 -2.32 ** -0.007 -3.85 *** -1.618 -0.89 -0.088 -5.33 ***
  SIZEit -0.719 -3.30 *** -0.598 -3.07 *** -0.666 -3.68 *** -0.600 -3.56 ***
  LOAN RATIOit -0.023 -1.86 * -0.035 -3.48 *** -0.039 -4.60 *** -0.015 -1.81 *
  ROAit -0.012 -0.27 -0.001 -0.02 -0.062 -0.57 0.059 1.32
No. Observations 1,262 1,262 1,155 1,155
F test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test 1rst order serial correlatoin (m1) /p-value -5.04 0.00 -4.92 0.00 -4.31 0.00 -4.31 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlatoin (m2) /p-value -1.40 0.16 -1.51 0.13 -1.13 0.26 -1.28 0.20
Hansen test (p-value) 0.25 0.47 0.51 0.28
Bank fixed effects,  ηi yes yes yes yes
C5_deposits Her_deposits Lerner_deposits
 
21t−iti
2t1ti2ti1
1t−iti
tiiti3ti2
NPL NPLln STRUCTURE + δ STRUCTURE  + γ GDPG + γ GDPG   + 
100 − − NPL 100 NPL
                            + φ SIZE  + φ LOAN RATIO +  η + ε  ,
= lnα + β +δ ti11t− φ ROA
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Table 5. Baseline including real interest rates
 
 
NPLit is the commercial non-performing loan ratio of  bank i at time t; GDPGt is the real GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy at time t; INTEREST RATEt is 
the one-day real interbank interest rate at time t; SIZEit is the market share of bank i at time t in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of 
firm i at time t in the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans to firms over total loans; ROAit is the return on assets of bank i at time t; Number of banksit is 
the number of banks that has the representative province for bank i at time t, calculated as the weighted average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the 
bank grants loans (the other concentration and competition measures are obtained in the same way); C5 denotes the share of the 5 largest banks in the 
representative province for bank i at time t; Herit is the Herfindahl index of concentration for the representative province of bank i at time t, calculated in each 
province as the sum of banks’ squared market shares in loans granted in the province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in year t defined for product l of the 
asset side as  (Rl -R)/ R l, where R is the credit risk adjusted marginal cost of product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is  defined as (R- Rl)/ R  for deposits. 
The time period analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003. We have 1,632 observations from which, after taking first differences and instrumenting remain 1,262  
corresponding to 107 unique banks. Standard errors (SE) of estimated coefficients consistent to any pattern of heteroskedasticity within banks. ***, **, *, mean  
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
STRUCTUREit
Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  Ln(NPLit-1/(100-NPLit-1)) 0.544 7.11 *** 0.564 7.29 *** 0.535 7.75 *** 0.650 11.71 *** 0.559 8.86 *** 0.624 9.45 ***
  GDPGt -0.104 -6.14 *** -0.093 -4.35 *** -0.091 -4.36 *** -0.070 -3.13 *** -0.069 -5.56 *** -0.068 -3.98 ***
  GDPGt-1 -0.043 -2.17 ** -0.033 -1.76 * -0.040 -2.36 ** -0.029 -1.78 * -0.025 -1.77 * -0.028 -1.76 ***
  Real interest ratet 0.030 1.86 * 0.041 2.29 ** 0.032 1.59  0.029 1.74 * 0.027 2.11  0.013 0.88  
  Real interest ratet-1 0.034 1.77 * 0.047 2.61 *** 0.053 2.86 *** 0.082 4.27 *** 0.066 4.89 *** 0.081 5.33 ***
  STRUCTUREit -3.183 -0.44  0.075 1.03  -0.059 -0.28  -0.562 -2.59 *** -1.051 -4.32 *** -0.833 -4.49 ***
  STRUCTUREit
2 0.872 0.5  -0.001 -0.85  0.009 0.78  -0.049 -2.29 ** -0.234 -2.42 *** -0.068 -4.58 ***
  SIZEit -0.442 -1.94 * -0.426 -2.51 ** -0.515 -2.52 ** -0.298 -1.90 * -0.187 -2.11  -0.199 -1.53 ***
  LOAN RATIOit -0.012 -1.16  -0.016 -1.33 -0.015 -1.53  0.012 1.05  0.013 1.37  0.013 1.24  
  ROAit -0.001 -0.03  -0.018 -0.54 -0.076 -1.13  -0.281 -2.25 ** -0.099 -1.31  -0.039 -0.50
No. Observations 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,155 1,155 1,155
F  test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.226 0.677 0.677 0.000
Test 1rst order serial correlatoin (m1) /p-value -3.95 0.00 -4.1 0.00 -4.24 0.00 -5.00 0.00 -4.64 0.00 -4.55 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlatoin (m2) /p-value -1.53 0.13 -1.56 0.12 -1.58 0.11 -0.94 0.35 -0.97 0.33 -1.14 0.25
Hansen test (p-value) 0.43 0.23 0.17 0.44 0.58 0.33
Bank fixed effects,  ηi yes yes yes yes yes yes
Ln(# banks) C5_loans Her_loans_firms Lerner_receivables Lerner_credit_lines Lerner_loans
I N T E R E S T R A T E + φ R O A + φ S IZ E + φ L O A N R A T I O + η + ε , 
1 t − i t i 
1 t − i t i 
t i i t i 3 t i 2 t i 1 1 t − 4 
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Table 6. Robustness test. Loan market 
SDNPLit is the standard deviation of the quarterly commercial non-performing loan ratio for the last two years of bank i at time t; GDPGt is the real GDP growth 
rate of the Spanish economy at time t; SIZEit is the market share of bank i at time t in terms of total loans; LOAN RATIOit measures the specialization of firm i at 
time t in the non-financial sector through the ratio of loans to firms over total loans; ROAit is the return on assets of bank i a t time t; Number of banksit is the 
number of banks that has the representative province for bank i at time t, calculated as the weighted average (by total loans) over all the provinces where the bank 
grants loans (the other concentration and competition measures are obtained in the same way); C5 denotes the share of the 5 largest banks in the representative 
province for bank i at time t; Herit is the Herfindahl index of concentration for the representative province of bank i at time t, calculated in each province as the 
sum of banks’ squared market shares in loans granted in the province; Lernerit is the Lerner index of bank i in year t defined for product l of the asset side as  (Rl -
R)/ R l, where R is the credit risk adjusted marginal cost of product l for bank j granted in year t, while it is  defined as (R- Rl)/ R  for deposits. The time period 
analyzed spans from 1988 to 2003. Standard errors (SE) of estimated coefficients consistent to any pattern of heteroskedasticity within banks. ***, **, *, mean 
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
STRUCTUREit
Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  Ln(1+SDNPLit-1) 0.473 7.58 *** 0.467 7.29 *** 0.482 7.60 *** 0.440 6.06 *** 0.405 4.83 *** 0.458 5.95 ***
  Ln(1+SDNPLit-2) -0.146 -3.38 *** -0.150 -3.65 *** -0.139 -3.29 *** -0.157 -3.62 *** -0.162 -3.74 *** -0.160 -3.66 ***
  Ln(1+SDNPLit-3) 0.060 1.13  0.056 1.02  0.072 1.36  0.047 0.99  0.042 0.84  0.064 1.40  
  GDPGt -0.021 -2.49 ** -0.021 -2.48 ** -0.023 -2.58 *** -0.019 -2.09 ** -0.019 -2.00 ** -0.021 -2.08 **
  GDPGt-1 -0.020 -2.24 ** -0.011 -1.32  -0.015 -1.79 * -0.019 -2.46 ** -0.016 -1.98 ** -0.019 -2.21 **
  STRUCTUREit -1.038 -0.32  0.040 0.82  -0.001 -0.02  -0.267 -3.08 *** -0.193 -1.54  -0.200 -2.03 **
  STRUCTUREit
2 0.330 0.41  0.000 -0.99  -0.001 -0.37  -0.025 -2.61 *** -0.084 -2.07 ** -0.017 -2.12 **
  SIZEit -0.146 -1.03  -0.144 -1.01  -0.200 -1.32  -0.190 -1.25  -0.190 -1.30  -0.217 -1.47  
  LOAN RATIOit -0.020 -4.27 *** -0.020 -4.00 *** -0.020 -3.99 *** -0.023 -4.87 *** -0.023 -3.82 *** -0.019 -3.50 ***
  ROAit -0.008 -0.24  -0.010 -0.28  -0.016 -0.39  0.015 0.31  0.019 0.65  0.036 1.21
No. Observations 957 957 957 957 957 957
F  test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test 1rst order serial correlatoin (m1) /p-value -6.56 0.00 -6.57 0.00 -6.6 0.00 -6.39 0.00 -5.71 0.00 -6.10 0.00
Test 2nd order serial correlatoin (m2) /p-value -0.48 0.63 -0.54 0.59 -0.46 0.65 -0.25 0.80 -0.39 0.70 -0.46 0.65
Hansen test (p-value) 0.76 0.77 0.81 0.67 0.70 0.79
Bank fixed effects,  ηi yes yes yes yes yes yes
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